

Public Sector Project Management in Zimbabwe: Lessons from the Construction of the Trabablas Interchange

SYLVESTER MARUMAHOKO ¹

¹Zimbabwe Open University

*Corresponding Author's Email: marumahokos@zou.ac.zw

Received: 17 October 2025 | Accepted: 15 March 2026 | Published: 31 May 2026

Abstract

This paper investigates the governance dynamics of public sector infrastructure delivery in Zimbabwe by examining the Trabablas Interchange project in Harare. Its primary aim is to extract lessons learned that can inform future policy and institutional reform. Guided by Project Governance Theory and Principal-Agent Theory, the study uses a qualitative case study design, analysing official documents, parliamentary records and media sourced interviews and reports. The thematic analysis is structured around five dimensions: procurement transparency, cost estimation, political influence, stakeholder displacement and oversight effectiveness. Findings reveal deficiencies in procurement and contractor selection, significant under estimation of costs, influence of political considerations over technical criteria, weak community consultation and displacement management and oversight that is reactive rather than embedded. Key lessons stress the need for competitive tendering, realistic budgeting with clear rules for cost changes, decision-making protected from political influence, early and thorough stakeholder engagement and strong oversight bodies to maintain accountability through the entire project lifecycle. These insights contribute to understanding how governance and institutional arrangements impact infrastructure project efficacy in Zimbabwe, with implications for similar contexts in sub Saharan Africa.

Keywords: infrastructure governance; procurement transparency; cost overruns; stakeholder engagement; accountability oversight

Introduction

The way infrastructure development projects are implemented is as important as the product itself. This is particularly true in large-scale public sector initiatives, where success is measured not only by physical delivery but also by the decisions, institutional practices and governance processes that shape project outcomes. In developing countries such as Zimbabwe, infrastructure projects often expose a persistent gap between policy ambition and implementation capacity. While the national development framework, National Development Strategy 1 (NDS1) places infrastructure at the centre of economic transformation (Government of Zimbabwe, 2020), delivery has frequently been marred by procurement irregularities, weak planning, cost overruns and delayed implementation (Dzuke & Naude, 2015). These systemic challenges point to a deeper governance problem that requires critical examination and structured learning.

This paper responds to that need by analysing the Trabablas Interchange project in Harare as a case through which to extract actionable lessons for public sector project management. Formerly known as the Mbudzi Roundabout, the Trabablas Interchange was a major

government-led road infrastructure project aimed at easing traffic congestion at a critical junction in the capital. While the project has been praised for its physical completion, it attracted intense scrutiny over its procurement process, escalating costs and political visibility. These dynamics make it a revealing case for assessing both the strengths and weaknesses of infrastructure governance in Zimbabwe.

Rather than offering a purely descriptive account, this study undertakes a reflective analysis of the project's implementation, with a focus on the underlying governance systems, institutional arrangements and decision-making processes that shaped its outcomes. The aim is to draw lessons that are not only practical but also theoretically informed and context sensitive.

To guide the analysis, the study applies Project Governance Theory, which offers a structured lens for examining how public infrastructure projects are steered, monitored and controlled (Müller, 2009; Too & Weaver, 2014). This framework allows for the evaluation of role assignment, decision-making and accountability mechanisms throughout the project lifecycle. Additionally, the study incorporates Principal-Agent Theory to explore the contractual relationships and oversight dynamics between government actors (principals) and contractors (agents). In many public projects, information asymmetries and incentive misalignments contribute to delivery failures (Eisenhardt, 1989). Applying this theory helps to unpack critical issues around contract enforcement, monitoring systems and the risks associated with delegated authority.

These two theoretical frameworks serve not only as conceptual foundations but also as diagnostic tools for identifying governance blind spots. Anchoring the analysis in theory enables a move beyond anecdotal critique toward evidence-based insights that can inform future reform.

The paper argues that the Trabablas Interchange reflects broader trends in Zimbabwe's public infrastructure landscape, particularly procurement opacity, cost underestimation, politicised decision-making, stakeholder exclusion and insufficient oversight. These themes are explored in the results and discussion sections, which unpack how each governance domain influenced the project's trajectory. The insights derived are interlinked and point to systemic weaknesses in project governance rather than isolated failures.

Finally, the study positions the Trabablas Interchange as a "learning case" for future reform. The intention is not to label the project as a failure, but to highlight the governance blind spots and institutional fragilities it reveals. Drawing from empirical evidence, stakeholder perspectives and peer-reviewed research, the paper emphasises the need to institutionalise learning in public infrastructure planning. If Zimbabwe is to realise the ambitions of NDS1 and beyond, it must not only build more infrastructure but also build better systems for managing it.

Research Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach, which is well-suited for in-depth exploration of a bounded system in this case, the Trabablas Interchange project, with the aim of generating contextually grounded insights (Yin, 2018). The methodological orientation is interpretive, focusing on understanding the governance dynamics, institutional behaviours and decision-making processes that shaped the implementation of this major public infrastructure project in Zimbabwe. A single case design was selected due to the emblematic nature of the

Trabablas Interchange, which offers a concentrated example of recurring governance challenges in Zimbabwean public project management.

Data collection involved a multi-source strategy centred on documentary analysis. Primary sources included official government publications, parliamentary Hansards, press releases and public audit summaries. These were supplemented by secondary materials such as investigative media reports, civil society commentaries and academic studies. Importantly, many of the direct quotations referenced in the results section were drawn from interviews conducted by journalists and civil society monitors during the project's implementation period. Although these interviews were not conducted by the author, they were carefully selected for their relevance, credibility and ability to provide unfiltered stakeholder perspectives. The inclusion of these voices strengthens the authenticity and diversity of the data while respecting the ethical boundaries of non-primary research.

The analysis employed a thematic framework guided by five key dimensions of infrastructure governance: (1) procurement and contracting transparency; (2) cost estimation and budget control; (3) decision-making structures and political influence; (4) stakeholder engagement and displacement; and (5) monitoring, accountability and oversight. These themes were not pre-imposed but emerged through iterative reading and coding of the collected materials, followed by categorisation based on recurring patterns, contradictions and governance implications. The theoretical lenses of Project Governance Theory (Müller, 2009; Too & Weaver, 2014) and Principal-Agent Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) informed both the development of the coding structure and the interpretation of findings. Project Governance Theory enabled a structured assessment of how decision rights, roles and oversight mechanisms were allocated and enacted, while Principal-Agent Theory helped surface issues of information asymmetry, incentive misalignment and risk delegation. The triangulation of official records, media-sourced interviews and literature allowed for a robust, context-sensitive analysis that reinforces the relevance and transferability of the lessons derived.

Results and discussion

This section presents the key findings of the study, organised thematically to reflect the governance dynamics and project management experiences observed during the implementation of the Trabablas Interchange. Drawing on official parliamentary records, government statements, media reports and secondary documentation, the results are analysed through the dual lenses of Project Governance Theory and Principal-Agent Theory. These theoretical perspectives help interpret how structural, political and procedural factors shaped the project's trajectory and outcomes. Rather than focusing solely on technical or engineering performance, the analysis is concerned with how decisions were made, who held power, how costs evolved and how stakeholder interests were managed or marginalised.

To structure this analysis, the study applies the five thematic categories developed earlier: (1) Procurement and Contracting Transparency, (2) Cost Estimation and Budget Control, (3) Decision-Making Structures and Political Influence, (4) Stakeholder Engagement and Displacement and (5) Monitoring, Accountability and Oversight. Each theme is explored through a combination of empirical evidence and theoretical interpretation, with particular emphasis on the lessons learned for future public infrastructure projects in Zimbabwe. These lessons are not just backwards-looking critiques, but forward-oriented insights aimed at strengthening institutional capacity and governance systems.

The themes presented below provide a multidimensional view of public sector project management in Zimbabwe, with the Trabablas Interchange serving as both a cautionary case and a source of policy-relevant learning. By analysing what happened, how it happened and why it unfolded as it did, this section identifies practical governance gaps and proposes measures for more accountable and transparent infrastructure delivery.

Procurement and Contracting Transparency

Document analysis and stakeholder interviews conducted for this study revealed serious concerns regarding the transparency of the procurement process in the awarding of the Trabablas Interchange contract. Public records and parliamentary debates suggest that the contract was granted to the Tefoma consortium without undergoing a formal, competitive tender process. According to media reports, “the government engaged Tefoma ... without going to tender,” raising suspicions about whether due process was followed (Pindula, 2025). Former Finance Minister Tendai Biti argued that the contract was “never subjected to an open international tender but instead awarded to a local cartel and its associates” (AllAfrica, 2025). These claims were echoed by opposition MPs who demanded to see the bills of quantities and procurement justification in Parliament. An internal source from the Ministry of Transport, speaking to Zimeye, stated: “There was no transparency in how the contractors were selected. Several companies that bid for the project were overlooked in favour of briefcase firms linked to senior officials” (Zimeye, 2025). Despite the scale of public investment—eventually reported at USD 114 million—the processes that led to the selection of contractors, the finalisation of contract terms and project pricing remained largely opaque to both Parliament and the public.

These findings align closely with broader academic literature on procurement practices in Zimbabwe, which consistently identifies limited transparency, selective tendering and political interference as systemic challenges. Zinyama and Hamadziripi (2023) observe that while Zimbabwe’s legal framework theoretically mandates competitive and transparent procurement, enforcement remains weak and prone to political manipulation. “Zimbabwe is lacking about effective enforcement of procurement standards non-competitive procurement results in reduced transparency, obscured oversight and increased risks of corruption” (p. 7). Similarly, Sandada and Kambarami (2016) found that tenders in state-owned enterprises were often awarded based not on merit but on informal networks and personal affiliations, concluding that “many tenders are awarded based on personal relationships rather than sound evaluation criteria” (p. 134). These scholarly observations mirror the concerns raised around the Trabablas Interchange, suggesting that the case is symptomatic of wider governance problems in public infrastructure procurement.

Interpreted through the lens of Project Governance Theory, the Trabablas case illustrates how the absence of transparent procurement processes erodes institutional accountability and undermines the legitimacy of public investment. When decision rights are unclear or subject to political override, governance frameworks fail to serve their function as tools for oversight and control. Principal-Agent Theory explains how opaque contracting environments create opportunities for agents, to exploit information asymmetries, secure favourable contract terms or inflate prices without detection. In this context, the lack of a competitive tender not only compromised public trust but also increased the likelihood of sub-optimal performance and misallocation of public funds.

A key lesson emerging from this case is that transparent, competitive procurement processes are foundational to effective project governance. The Trabablas Interchange experience underscores that transparency must not be treated as a procedural box-ticking exercise but as a continuous commitment to openness, fairness and accountability. Public access to tender notices, evaluation criteria, contract terms and contractor ownership structures is essential for holding decision-makers to account and for enabling independent scrutiny. This aligns with recommendations by Sandada and Kambarami (2016), who emphasise the need for depoliticising procurement processes and professionalising oversight institutions. In addition, oversight bodies such as the Procurement Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (PRAZ), the Auditor General and parliamentary committees must be fully empowered to demand compliance, conduct real-time audits and sanction breaches without fear or favour. Without these mechanisms, public procurement will remain vulnerable to manipulation and infrastructure delivery will continue to suffer from credibility and capacity deficits.

Cost Estimation and Budget Control

Parliamentary disclosures in Zimbabwe show that the original estimate for the Trabablas Interchange was about USD 65 million, later supplemented by a loan of USD 88 million, only to culminate in a final cost of approximately USD 114 million. Finance Minister Ncube explained to Parliament: "The cost of relocating some of the residents ... was quite onerous and that caused the budget to go beyond what was initially budgeted" (Zimbabwe Live, 2025; Pindula, 2025). In his breakdown, he enumerated several costs not anticipated in the original estimate, including "supervisor fees," bridge works, electrical installations and compensation (The Zimbabwean, 2025). These extra cost components reflect both scope variations and underestimation of risk, especially around social and site-preparation costs, which were not built into the first budget lines.

Through the lens of Project Governance Theory, this discrepancy between early cost estimates and final expenditure indicates structural weakness in governance mechanisms responsible for planning, risk assessment and budget control. A robust governance system ought to ensure realistic estimates, identify potential cost drivers (such as relocation, compensation and design changes) and embed contingency plans. Principal-Agent Theory helps to unpack how agents may under forecast costs to secure project approval, anticipating that cost overruns will be accepted later due to political or reputational pressures. In this case, the "unforeseen" costs became predictable once project implementation began, pointing to initial estimation bias and weak cost monitoring tools.

Literature from comparable settings confirms that such patterns are widespread in public infrastructure. For example, Asiedu and Adaku (2020) found that in Ghana, "poor contract planning and supervision; change orders; weak institutional and economic environment of projects and lack of effective coordination among the contracting parties" contribute significantly to overruns (pp. 70–71). In a study of South African mega projects (Medupi and Kusile), Tshidavhu and Khatleli (2021) identified incomplete design at the tendering stage, delays in approving variation orders and inadequate cost planning and monitoring as major causes of both schedule and cost overruns (pp. 130–132). Such findings mirror the Trabablas experience, where many cost items were only recognised late, contracts included scope changes and oversight was reactive rather than proactive.

From these findings and the supporting literature emerges a lesson that early project planning must be comprehensive and conservative, incorporating all potential cost drivers, including

social (compensation, relocation), environmental, engineering and site-specific risks. It is critical that feasibility studies and initial designs are sufficiently detailed, with built in contingency and that budgetary baselines are updated regularly as project scope solidifies. Further, contracts should include explicit mechanisms for variation management, transparent cost reporting and independent cost audits so that deviations can be monitored, justified and kept within acceptable bounds; without these, estimates are likely to be optimistic, leading to cost overruns, erosion of trust and risk to project financial viability.

Decision Making Structures and Political Influence

In the Trabablas Interchange project, decision making appears heavily influenced by political actors rather than purely technical or institutional criteria. For example, the naming of the project, changed from “Mbudzi Roundabout” to “Trabablas Interchange” to reflect President Mnangagwa’s war name. This was justified by Information Minister Jenfan Muswere as recognising “the visionary leadership of His Excellency ...”, a decision that seems more symbolic than technical (Pindula, 2024). Former Finance Minister Biti criticised what he called a lack of open tendering, alleging that contractors with political links were advantaged: “a local cartel and its associates” being favoured over open competition (AllAfrica, 2025). Internal sources also expressed concern that “several companies that bid ... were overlooked in favour of briefcase firms linked to senior officials” (Zimeye, 2025). Collectively, these observations suggest that critical project decisions, including contractor selection, project naming and financing structures, were significantly shaped by political considerations.

Drawing on Project Governance Theory, these dynamics highlight how weak or informal decision making structures allow political interests to override institutional norms and technical merit. Governance frameworks are intended to clarify who has decision rights, under what criteria and with what oversight; in this case, centralisation of authority and lack of transparent criteria appear to have permitted political discretion to dominate key stages. Principal Agent Theory warns that where agents are not bound by strong procedural constraints or where principals lack the ability or will to enforce those constraints, agents will be incentivised to act in ways that secure political favour or visibility rather than optimal project outcomes. The case of the Trabablas project indicates that decision points that is, contractor choice, project scope and symbolic naming were likely leveraged for political capital, sometimes at the expense of cost efficiency, engineering integrity or stakeholder fairness.

Research in Zimbabwe and elsewhere supports the observation that political influence in infrastructure and procurement decision making is a common and problematic phenomenon. Chilunjika, Intauno, Uwizeyimana & Chilunjika (2022) in their study found that “transparency deficiencies in tendering processes have become widespread, shielding and snowballing tender corruption”. Their empirical evidence showed that over 58% of respondents believed that partisan politics exerts a very high influence on tender outcomes (Chilunjika et al., 2022). In the Free State province of South Africa, Godongwana (2024) reported that political interference in key phases like bid appraisal and tender award contributes to cost overruns, delays and substandard infrastructure quality, with one participant in that study noting, “contract granting for political advantage ... is among the most common forms of corruption linked with government employees” (p. 45). These studies mirror what is observable in the Trabablas case, reinforcing that political influence in decision making is not unique but part of a broader pattern in similar governance environments.

From these converging findings, a lesson emerges that decision making structures must be formalised and insulated from undue political influence to ensure integrity in infrastructure delivery. Institutional frameworks should define decision rights clearly: who makes which decisions, under what criteria and with what recourse for challenge or appeal. Criteria for contractor selection, scope adjustments and naming or branding of projects should be made public and subject to independent oversight. Conflict of interest policies need strict enforcement, especially where contractors have connections to political elites. Further, technical quality audits should be embedded throughout project lifecycles, not only after completion, so that political visibility or symbolic gestures do not compromise engineering standards or inflate costs.

Stakeholder Engagement and Displacement

In the case of the Trabablas Interchange project, the relocation and compensation of affected households emerged as significant concerns, both in terms of cost implications and the legitimacy of the process. Parliamentary statements acknowledged that the project “spent substantial amounts on relocation and compensation,” and some reports suggest affected residents were unclear about processes, valuations and timelines (Zimbabwe Live, 2025; Pindula, 2025). Media reporting and interviews with local leaders revealed that while the displacement was inevitable due to the road layout and land use, there was “little consultation with those affected before enforcement of relocation orders” (Zimeye, 2025). Complaints included that detours and pedestrian access changes were not clearly communicated and valuation methodologies lacked transparency, leading to a perception of unfairness among some displaced individuals.

Viewed through Project Governance Theory, such gaps in stakeholder engagement and displacement practice indicate a deficiency in mechanisms that ensure legitimacy, social equity and procedural fairness. Governance frameworks assume that public legitimacy derives not only from legal compliance but from inclusive participation, adequate information flows and fair compensation (Too & Weaver, 2014). From a principal Agent perspective, agents with more information such as project promoters, contractors may neglect or underplay the rights and concerns of less powerful stakeholders. When communities are insufficiently engaged or when displacement costs are not adequately anticipated, agents may delay or avoid compensating impacts until after contracts are signed, anticipating lower resistance or public scrutiny.

The broader literature backs this pattern. In Zimbabwe, the Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT) has documented numerous development induced displacement (DID) incidents where consultative processes were insufficient or tokenistic and where policies failed to protect livelihood and heritage (CCMT, 2021; Kubatana, 2021). In addition, Xegwana, Twum Darko and Tengeh (2025) found in a South African public housing case that poor communication and political polarisation were major contributors to delivery challenges: “insufficient public input, poor communication and political polarisation ...” undermined both acceptance and satisfaction with the outcomes (Xegwana et al., 2025, p. 3). Lessons from Trabablas aligned with these: meaningful stakeholder engagement must be built into planning from the outset, rather than invoked late as damage control. Transparent and fair compensation processes, early disclosure of displacement impact and open channels for affected people to voice concerns are essential. Without such engagement, projects may save time in the short run but suffer delays, legal challenges, reputational damage and cost escalations in later stages.

Monitoring, Accountability and Oversight

In the case of the Trabablas Interchange, oversight mechanisms were in place; for instance, parliamentarians demanded cost breakdowns and the finance minister acknowledged that initial budget projections had been exceeded due to expenses related to relocation, compensation, bridge works, supervisory fees and other variations (Zimbabwe Live, 2025; The Zimbabwean, 2025). However, many observers criticised these mechanisms as reactive rather than embedded. Critical documents such as detailed tender contracts, bills of quantities and variation orders were not publicly available until after key decisions had been made. Calls for forensic audits and greater public disclosure emerged only after controversies surrounding cost overruns became prominent (AllAfrica, 2025). Community and media actors continue to demand more transparent, real time tracking of project progress and expenditures.

Project Governance Theory suggests that effective governance requires continuous monitoring, institutionalised accountability and formal oversight (Müller, 2009; Too & Weaver, 2014). Shifting accountability only at project completion or under public pressure undermines these structures. From a principal Agent viewpoint, unchecked agents have incentive to delay disclosure of adverse information, under report deviations or classify deviations as “unforeseen variations” to avoid scrutiny. The Trabablas case illustrates the danger of leaving oversight to ad hoc disclosures rather than embedding it through contractual and institutional design.

Empirical research in Zimbabwe provides corroborative evidence that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are often under utilised or under resourced. For example, Chari (2018), in her study of Norton Town Council, found that while M&E policies do exist, councils struggle to operationalise them due to technical, financial and capacity constraints; many performance indicators are tracked only superficially or as afterthoughts (Chari, 2018). Similarly, research by Moyo (2024) on the drivers for institutionalisation of public sector M&E in Zimbabwe concluded that there is growing demand for evidence based decision making and regulatory compliance, but that enforcement, data availability, staff competence and resourcing remain significant challenges (Moyo, 2024). The lesson here is that oversight must not be reactive or symbolic; it should be proactive, continuous and embedded in contracts and institutional arrangements. Regular public disclosure of financial, technical and social performance metrics, periodic independent audits and public participation in oversight can strengthen credibility, reduce cost overruns and enhance project legitimacy.

Conclusion and recommendations

The way infrastructure development projects are implemented is just as important as their physical outputs. This study set out to explore public sector project management in Zimbabwe through the lens of the Trabablas Interchange, a flagship road infrastructure project that, while physically completed, raised significant questions around governance, transparency, participation and accountability. At the heart of the problem was a growing concern that major public works in Zimbabwe continue to suffer from weak institutional frameworks, politicised decision-making and opaque contracting processes, all of which undermine the integrity, legitimacy and developmental value of such investments.

Using a qualitative case study approach grounded in document analysis, interviews and review of parliamentary records and media reports, the paper interrogated five interlinked thematic areas: procurement and contracting transparency; cost estimation and budget control; decision-making structures and political influence; stakeholder engagement and displacement; and

monitoring, accountability and oversight. The study was guided by Project Governance Theory and Principal-Agent Theory, both of which provided analytical tools to understand how formal institutions and informal political dynamics interact to shape project outcomes.

Findings from the Trabablas case confirmed that procurement processes were not sufficiently transparent, with competitive bidding bypassed and contractor selection heavily influenced by political considerations. Cost estimations were significantly understated at the planning stage, with final expenditures rising to USD 114 million, an overrun partly explained by relocation costs and scope creep, but also symptomatic of weak risk planning and oversight. Decision-making structures were shown to be centralised and opaque, with symbolic political gestures such as renaming the project after the President's war name. This underscores the influence of politics over professional project management norms. Stakeholder engagement, particularly with displaced communities, was reactive and insufficient, contributing to grievances and a perception of procedural unfairness. Oversight institutions, including Parliament, the Auditor General and PRAZ, were found to be reactive, with monitoring mechanisms activated only after costs escalated or controversy emerged.

Lessons from this case study suggest that Zimbabwe's infrastructure governance frameworks require urgent strengthening. Transparent procurement processes, grounded in open competition, public disclosure and professional evaluation are critical for both cost control and public trust. Realistic and detailed cost planning must be accompanied by rigorous variation control and independent cost auditing. Decision-making rights must be formalised to protect infrastructure development from excessive political manipulation, while stakeholder engagement must shift from tokenism to meaningful participation, particularly where displacement or environmental disruption is involved. Institutional oversight must be proactive and adequately resourced, with real-time public reporting and enforceable accountability mechanisms built into project cycles from inception to closure.

Future research could benefit from comparing multiple infrastructure projects across sectors (for example, energy, housing, water) to assess whether the governance patterns observed in the Trabablas Interchange are systemic. There is also a need for empirical studies that investigate the capacity and independence of Zimbabwe's project oversight institutions, as well as the impact of governance reforms such as the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, on transparency and accountability. Finally, longitudinal studies tracking the performance and maintenance outcomes of politically driven infrastructure may shed light on whether project success is defined solely by physical completion or by broader developmental impact.

References

- AllAfrica. (2025, June 1). Zimbabwe: Trabablas Interchange – a shoddy, vulgar sobriquet of raw looting – says ex-finance minister Biti. New Zimbabwe. <https://www.allafrica.com/stories/202506020044.html>
- Asiedu, R. O., & Adaku, E. (2020). Cost overruns of public sector construction projects: A developing country perspective. *International Journal of Managing Projects in Business*, 13(1), 66–84. <https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMPB-09-2018-0177>
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.3316/QRJ0902027>
- Chilunjika, A., Intauno, K., Uwizeyimana, D. E., & Chilunjika, S. R. T. (2022). Dynamics of patronage politics and the tendering process at Zimbabwe's State Procurement Board.

- African Journal of Governance and Development, 11(1.1), 79–103.
<https://ajgd.journalofgovernance.com>
- Dzuke, A., & Naude, M. (2015). Procurement challenges in the Zimbabwean public sector: A preliminary study. *Journal of Transport and Supply Chain Management*, 9(1), 1–9.
<https://doi.org/10.4102/jtscm.v9i1.166>
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. *Academy of Management Review*, 14(1), 57–74. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1989.4279003>
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2009). Survival of the unfittest: Why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(3), 344–367.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grp024>
- Godongwana, A. (2024). The impact of political interference on the quality of infrastructural delivery of projects in the Free State (master's dissertation). University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
- Government of Zimbabwe. (2020). National Development Strategy 1 (2021–2025): Towards a prosperous and empowered upper middle-income society by 2030. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.
- Müller, R. (2009). Project governance. Gower Publishing.
- Parliament of Zimbabwe. (2025, July 9). National Assembly Hansard, 51(62). Government of Zimbabwe. Official Hansard.
- Pindula. (2025, July 10). Trabablas Interchange cost US\$114 million, Mthuli tells Parliament. Pindula News. <https://news.pindula.co.zw/2025/07/10/trabablas-interchange-cost-us114-million-mthuli-tells-parliament/>
- Sandada, M., & Kambarami, P. (2016). The determinants of the compliance to public procurement policy requirements among public enterprises in Zimbabwe. *Acta Universitatis Danubius. Administratio*, 8(1), 124–137.
- The Zimbabwean. (2025, July 11). Mthuli breaks down US\$114 million Trabablas Interchange cost. The Zimbabwean. <https://www.thezimbabwean.co/2025/07/mthuli-breaks-down-us114-million-trabablas-interchange-cost/>
- Too, E., & Weaver, P. (2014). The management of project management: A conceptual framework for project governance. *International Journal of Project Management*, 32, 1382–1394. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.006>
- Turner, J. R. (2006). Towards a theory of project management: The nature of the project governance and project management. *International Journal of Project Management*, 24, 93–95. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2005.11.008>
- Zimbabwe Live. (2025, July 10). Shock as Ncube reveals real cost of Trabablas Interchange was US\$114 million. Zimbabwe Live. <https://www.zimlive.com/shock-as-ncube-reveals-real-cost-of-trabablas-interchange-was-114-million/>
- Zimeye. (2025, July 10). Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube grilled over \$114 million road project mystery MP Mutseyami demands answers on unbudgeted \$26 million spend for Trabablas Interchange. <https://www.zimeye.net/2025/07/10/%F0%9F%9A%A8-finance-minister-mthuli-ncube-grilled-over-114-million-road-project-mystery-mp-mutseyami-demands-answers-on-unbudgeted-26-million-spend-for-harare-interchange/>
- Zinyama, T., & Hamadziripi, F. (2023). An analysis of direct public procurement in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Public Administration and Development Alternatives*, 8(3), 1–14.